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Abstract
We examine the e⁄ects of dividend policies on 469 British ￿rms between 1895 and
1905. These ￿rms operated in an environment of very low taxation and an absence of
institutional constraints. We ￿nd strong support for asymmetric information/signaling
theories of dividend policy, and little support for agency models. Our results suggest
that dividends can signal information from managers to shareholders, even if dividend
payments incur only very low taxes. However, taxes appear to be necessary to allow
dividend policies to resolve agency problems between managers and investors.
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1The theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1961) states that, if capital markets are perfect,
a ￿rm￿ s decision of if, when, and how much of its cash should be disbursed to shareholders
is irrelevant for the ￿rm￿ s value. In practice, the assumption of perfect capital markets does
not hold and a ￿rm￿ s dividend policy is important.
Taxes are one of the main factors leading to the failure of the theorem. Taxes, for
instance, increase the cost of dividend payments in many jurisdictions (including the U.S.),
which tends to reduce ￿rms￿total payouts and induces managers to retain earnings and to
use share repurchases (see Allen and Michaely (2002) and Chetty and Saez (2005)). Taxes
also in￿ uence the importance of two competing (although not mutually exclusive) rationales
for dividend payments, asymmetric information and agency issues. Signaling (asymmetric
information) theories state that dividends are a costly signal available to managers to convey
information about a ￿rm￿ s future prospects. By making dividends more expensive, taxes also
make dividend payments more informative.
Agency theories suggest that managers could allocate resources to activities that bene￿t
themselves, at the expense of shareholders. In situations where institutional investors are
taxed less than individual investors, ￿rms may pay dividends to attract more institutions,
which have a relative advantage in monitoring ￿rms, thus alleviating agency problems (see
Allen et al. (2000) and Jensen (1986)).
Despite a large literature on the interaction of dividends and taxation, little is known
about the relevance of taxes to determine the importance of signaling and agency based
explanations. To better identify these channels we examine an extreme environment where
taxes on dividends were almost absent and where each investor was taxed at the same
rate: Britain before World War One. We use a data set of 469 British ￿rms traded on
the London Stock Exchange between 1895 and 1905. We document the impact of dividend
announcements on security prices, we analyze which types of ￿rms were more likely to pay
dividends, and we study the role of taxes in determining the validity of the signaling versus
the agency hypothesis.
Understanding the importance of taxes to each of the theories is important for two
reasons. First, a better knowledge of the role of taxes will be helpful to understand if taxation
2only distorts ￿rms￿investment policies (for instance, by inducing managers to retain more
earnings) or if taxes are a useful instrument to overcome market imperfections by mitigating
agency problems (by attracting institutional shareholders with better abilities to monitor
management). Second, a large number of ￿nance studies have attempted to evaluate the
validity of signaling theories versus agency theories as alternative explanations for dividend
policies. If we understand the empirical relevance of taxation for each explanation that will
help us to understand what the necessary conditions are to have each theory work, and under
what circumstances one theory may dominate the other.
In an environment such as pre-World War One Britain, signaling theories (e.g. Bhat-
tacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Bernheim (1991), and Bernheim and Wantz
(1995)) predict that dividend changes contain little or no information. Agency theories (e.g.
Allen et al., (2000)) would imply that companies where agency problems were more severe
could not have used high dividend payments to attract institutional investors, at the expense
of retail investors.
We ￿nd that dividends e⁄ectively signalled information to shareholders, which suggests
that tax explanations are not needed for this channel to operate. An announcement of a
dividend cut or a dividend omission was bad news for ￿rms, it tended to generate a negative
abnormal return of around 2.0% in the week of the announcement. The e⁄ects of cuts or
omissions do not markedly di⁄er between ￿rms ranked by either age, Tobin￿ s Q, or retained
equity. Announcements of dividend increases or commencements generated positive abnor-
mal returns of around 1.4% in the week of the announcement. These ￿gures are similar to
those reported in studies of environments with higher tax rates (e.g. Grullon et al., 2002).
The e⁄ects of increases or commencements do not vary markedly between di⁄erent types of
￿rms. These results suggest that, although taxes were close to zero, dividend announcements
conveyed private information held by ￿rm insiders to shareholders, and support the asym-
metric information theories of payout policy. In particular, we ￿nd that a ￿rm￿ s dividend
policy conveyed information about the ￿rm￿ s future pro￿tability and that dividend increases
(decreases) were associated with increases (decreases) in earnings in the next ￿nancial year.
This result is in line with the ￿ndings of Amihud and Murgia (1997), that dividend changes
3provide signals to investors even in environments where dividends are taxed more heavily
than capital gains.
On the other hand, taxes appear to be important for agency theories: companies that
faced more severe agency problems were no more likely to pay higher dividends. Higher
dividends can only attract large, institutional investors, at the expense of retail investors,
if those institutions are tax-advantaged. There were no tax advantages for institutions
in our sample, therefore paying higher dividends would be ine⁄ective in attracting those
institutions. Although long-established ￿rms (such as railways) paid out a higher proportion
of their pro￿ts as dividends, company age and the ratio of retained earnings to nominal
ordinary equity (both proxies of the maturity of the company) did not increase the likelihood
that a ￿rm would pay a dividend. We also ￿nd that the probability of paying a dividend
decreased for ￿rms with relatively few investment opportunities (measured by Tobin￿ s Q). It
is unlikely that the lack of correlation between company maturity and dividend payouts was
driven by poor investor protection that led managers to act against shareholders￿interests.
We ￿nd that managers were concerned with agency issues, however they resolved them using
alternative methods. Our results show that more mature companies had stronger restrictions
on managers￿discretionary borrowing powers (the power to borrow money without asking
for the explicit consent of their shareholders) and they attracted institutions that would
monitor their debt, not their equity, by establishing multiple bank relationships.
In other respects, the dividend policy of turn of the 20th century British ￿rms is similar
to contemporary ￿rms. We ￿nd that British ￿rms had similar payout ratios to contempo-
rary ￿rms: about 90% of earnings was disbursed to shareholders; moreover more pro￿table
companies were more likely to pay a dividend.
In Section II we review the main theories of dividend policies. In Section III we overview
the ￿scal and legislative environment in Britain at the turn of the Twentieth Century. We
present our main results in Section IV, examine unlisted companies in Section V, and con-
clude in Section VI.
4I Theories of Dividend Payouts
Lintner (1956) was the ￿rst to systematically assess the dividend policies of corporations.
His interviews with senior managers at 28 ￿rms document that most managers believe stock-
holders prefer a stable rate of dividends, and will place a premium on ￿rms that can deliver
stable dividends. He ￿nds behaviour of dividend-smoothing by managers (Lintner (1956, p.
99)): ￿most managements sought to avoid making changes in their dividend rates that might
have to be reversed within a year or so.￿
The information signaling models of Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and
John and Williams (1985) suggest that ￿rms will use dividend changes to signal the future
prospects of the ￿rm. Managers have more information about their ￿rm￿ s future cash ￿ ows
than individuals outside the ￿rm, and managers may have an incentive to signal this in-
formation to their shareholders. An unanticipated rise in dividends is good news for the
shareholders, and should be accompanied by a rise in the share price, whereas a fall in the
dividend conveys bad news to shareholders. For these signalling models to hold in equi-
librium, dividend changes should be followed by earnings changes in the same direction.
Moreover, by making dividend more expensive, taxes also make dividend payments more
informative - only a very pro￿table ￿rm would ￿nd it bene￿cial to pay dividends (and the
associated high taxes) to signal its high pro￿tability. As a result, the stock price reaction to
an unexpected dividend rise should be larger when taxes are higher.
Agency models recognize that a ￿rm is comprised of at least three di⁄erent stakeholders:
management, shareholders, and bondholders, and the three groups￿interests may diverge.
Shareholders in a struggling company may like to pay themselves such large dividends that
bondholders will miss out on their scheduled payments. Management may be tempted to
use the ￿rm￿ s resources in a way that is not in the best interests of the shareholders. In the
words of Allen and Michaely (2002 p. 62): ￿these activities can range from lavish expenses
on corporate jets to unjusti￿able acquisitions and expansions.￿Solutions to the con￿ ict of
interest problem that management face have been suggested by Grossman and Hart (1980),
Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986). Management should be constrained in how much
5readily accessible cash they have access to. The less cash available to management, the
harder it is for them to spend it in wasteful pursuits. By paying out cash as dividends it
reduces the cash at the disposal of management, and can increase the value of the ￿rm.
One version of the agency model, by Lang and Litzenberger (1989), is that wasteful uses
of cash are likely to be more pronounced in stable, cash-rich ￿rms in mature industries
without many growth opportunities. Therefore, an increase in dividends should have a
greater (positive) price impact for ￿rms that have few investment opportunities than for
￿rms that have many investment opportunities. Taken to the extreme, if a ￿rm has many
positive net present value projects, then increasing the cash distributed to shareholders
as dividends could even decrease the value of the ￿rm. When institutional investors are
taxed less than individual investors, taxes can be an useful instrument to resolve agency
problems. Companies can raise their dividend payments to attract institutional investors,
who are usually better equipped than retail investors to monitor the behavior of managers. A
greater number of large shareholders should provide an e⁄ective check on managerial excess,
especially in mature companies where agency problems have the potential to be more severe
(see Jensen (1986) and Allen et al. (2000)).
Aside from tax issues, the remaining Miller and Modigliani (1961) assumptions, complete
contracting, no transaction costs, and complete markets were not satis￿ed in U.K. securities
markets in the early twentieth century. However, it is arguable that violations of these
assumptions were no worse than they are today. Managers were forced to hold stock in
their own ￿rms, and their salary was voted on at the AGM. Although managers could be
voted out of o¢ ce, complete contracts could not be written that would have prevented the
scandals that did occur from time to time. Markets were incomplete, due to the lack of
complete state-contingent contracts, but nor can such contracts be written now (although
the recent development of markets for derivatives has helped). The London Stock Exchange
had low brokerage fees, due to the desire to maintain world preeminence as a ￿nancial
market, with thousands of competing brokers, yet transaction costs were positive, as they
are today. The ￿recognised￿brokerage fees for equities were 1
4% per transaction under £50,
1
2% per transaction over £50 but this could be negotiated downwards for large dealings (see
6The Investor￿ s Monthly Manual for details).
II Historical Background
Pre-1907, pro￿ts of incorporated U.K. ￿rms were taxed at the same rate as the personal
(labour) tax rate.1 When dividends were paid, the ￿rm would deduct the relevant tax
from the dividend and send it to the government, known as taxation at the source (see
Arnold (1999)). Dividends and interest income were treated identically. The relevant tax
rate in the U.K. was around 5% during the period of our study, therefore there was little
incentive for ￿rms to be creative in how they returned wealth to shareholders.2 Dividends
were by far the principal means of returning wealth. Stock repurchases had been forbidden
by common law, following Trevor v. Whitworth (1887), and one-o⁄ returns of capital were
very infrequent, and required the sanction of a court. There was no tax levied on capital
gains in this period.3 Although charities were tax exempt we do not believe they were major
investors in British ￿rms. The almost total irrelevance of tax complications allows us to
focus on alternative explanations of dividend policy. Although the Joint Stock Companies
Registration and Regulation Act, 1844 and subsequent Companies Acts required that ￿rms
only paid dividends out of current or retained pro￿ts: ￿it was not until the Companies
Act, 1980 that a de￿nition of distributable pro￿ts was incorporated into legislation. This
absence appears to have signi￿cantly constrained the British judiciary￿(Ardern and Aiken
(2005) p. 24). The one clear exception was that: ￿dividend payments could not be made to
shareholders where there are no ￿ pro￿ts￿reported￿(Ardern and Aiken (2005) p. 44).
A further advantage of our data set is the absence of regulations that constrain how
investors allocate their funds. ￿Prudent man￿rules have been suggested as an explanation
for why ￿rms pay dividends. In some jurisdictions laws constrain the behaviour of certain
1http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/history/taxhis4.htm
2The tax rate was 31
3% (8 pence in the pound) in the late years of the 19th century. It was raised to 5%
at the start of the Boer War (1899), to 5:833% in 1900 and to 6:25% in 1901. The rate was cut to 4:583%
in 1902, but raised again to 5% in 1904 (see Sabine (1966) pp. 129-30).
3See Daunton (2001), Trusting Leviathan, for a discussion of the U.K. capital gains tax in this period.
7types of investors (e.g. private trusts, bank trusts, and pension funds) to invest in ￿high
quality￿equities, such as those that pay dividends (see Del Guercio (1996)). In response to
these laws some ￿rms will pay dividends to cater to such investors.
The Friendly Societies Act, 1875, Section 16, as originally proposed, forbade the invest-
ment of society funds into any security: ￿which has not paid (a) dividend for the last two
successive years prior to such purchase ... and the purchase of shares in any company ..., the
liability of whose members is unlimited.￿However, the amended Act allowed investment of
society funds into: ￿any ... security expressly directed by the rules of the society.￿ 4
Investment trusts (mutual funds) ￿rst appeared in the U.K. in 1868 and by January 1895
there were 51 trust companies listed in The Investor￿ s Monthly Manual. We do not believe
that trusts can be considered to be dividend clienteles, the trusts were not actively managed:
￿most of the early trusts were ￿ ￿xed￿in the sense that the composition of the portfolio could
be changed only in exceptional circumstances￿(see Hutson (2005) p. 449). Although towards
the end of the 19th century there was more discretion shown by managers: ￿investment trusts
in the 19th century largely comprised foreign securities￿(see Hutson p. 450). There appear
to be few regulatory reasons to suspect the formation of dividend clienteles.
Most of the data we use in this analysis come from annual report and balance sheets
of publicly quoted companies. The quality of information present in published accounts,
and public statements of company o¢ cials during this time in the U.K. is arguably limited
when compared to present day standards. Arnold (1998) claims that: ￿during the ￿rst
quarter of the twentieth century, ￿nancial accounting practice was only lightly regulated,
published accounting statements contained relatively limited amounts of information and
informational asymmetry between senior managers and the suppliers of long-term corporate
￿nance was material.￿However, what emerges from historical accounts is that British annual
reports at the turn of the twentieth century were generally a reliable source. Sylla and Smith
(1995) claim that Britain had the best quality accounting information in the Western world.
Similarly, Hannah (2007(b)) reports that ￿the great majority of companies published more
4The Friendly Societies Act covered Friendly Societies, Working Men￿ s Clubs, Benevolent Societies, Build-
ing Societies, Trade Unions, Savings Banks, and Scienti￿c and Literary Societies.
8and better information that was legally required and, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, this was treated by contemporary investors as broadly accurate￿(Hannah 2007(b)
p. 658). Audited accounts were required by banks from 1879 onwards and by all ￿rms from
1900 onwards (see Hein (1963)). All the ￿rms￿accounting statements we examine have been
certi￿ed by auditors. Auditors were elected at the AGM (a legal requirement from 1900
onwards). The Companies Act, 1900 required auditors to certify that the accounts re￿ ected
a ￿true and correct view of the state of the Company￿ s a⁄airs￿ , before this auditors would
usually sign o⁄ on the accounts with something similar to the auditors of Henry Briggs,
Son and Company, Ltd. (1899): ￿examined and found correct.￿Annual balance sheets were
required to be furnished by ￿rms, and although usually provided, annual pro￿t and loss
statements were not required by law until 1928 (see Hein (1963)).
III Data
We obtain balance sheets and, where available, pro￿t and loss statements for ￿rms in our
sample from the Guildhall Library in London. Accounting data for electrical, telegraph, and
telephone ￿rms comes from Garcke￿ s Manual of Electricity Undertakings. We collect weekly
data on security prices from the Stock Exchange Daily O¢ cial List (SEDOL), also available
at the Guildhall Library, between 1893 and 1907. The SEDOL contains bid and ask quotes,
transaction prices (if any), issued capital, last two dividend amounts, and the ex-dividend
day for all securities o¢ cially listed on the London Stock Exchange.5 We calculate the price
of a security as the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes.
We ￿nd dates of annual general meetings (AGMs) from the annual reports in the Guildhall
Library. The protocol for dividend paying British ￿rms at this time was that the company￿ s
management would propose a dividend about 2 weeks before the AGM, and the proposed
dividend would usually appear in the London daily newspaper, The Times (available elec-
tronically from The Times Digital Archive 1785-1985). The proposed dividend would then
5Although we would like to collect data on the ownership structure of the ￿rms in our sample, most early
20th century U.K. ownership data no longer exists (see Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2006)).
9be subject to approval at the AGM. Although management ￿proposed￿ the dividend, in
practice it was invariably approved by the vote at the AGM. The Times usually reported a
company￿ s end of year dividend amount alongside a brief summary of a company￿ s earnings
for the year. We understand that ￿rms would mail out the ￿nancial reports to shareholders
before the AGM at the same time as the dividend ￿proposal￿was made, even if only the
dividend amount was reported in The Times. We therefore have a potentially confounding
e⁄ect of dividend and earnings announcements that we address econometrically in Section
V.
The Times reported on the a⁄airs of many British companies that were listed on the
London Stock Exchange. We search each day￿ s ￿nancial pages between 1895 and 1905 to
￿nd dividend announcements. The column ￿Railway and Other Companies￿(changed to
￿Public Companies￿in 1905) contains dividend announcements and reports on the proceed-
ings of AGMs. We can not ￿nd all proposed dividends in The Times. Some ￿rms would
never be reported on by The Times, usually the smaller, infrequently traded companies, and
some companies would only sporadically report their dividends. The only exception to this
protocol was by British banks. Although most banks were easily large enough to justify the
attention of The Times, we can only ￿nd seven dividend announcements by banks during
this 11 year period. We therefore exclude banks from our analysis.
We ￿nd the dividend amounts, quoted as a percentage of paid up capital, from the original
annual reports. We cross-check these with the SEDOL, the Investors￿Monthly Manual, and
(if announced) The Times. Almost all ￿rms paid semi-annual dividends, the major exception
was that many telegraph ￿rms paid quarterly dividends. We ￿nd that announcements of
dividend increases were most likely to appear in The Times (82% of our ￿rms￿increases
were reported), followed by dividend decreases (68% of our ￿rms￿decreases were reported),
and the least likely announcements to appear were dividends maintained at the same level
(60%).
We construct a value-weighted market index for London that contains 163 securities.
The market index is composed of seven banks, 33 railways, 7 breweries, 63 commercial and
industrial ￿rms, 19 coal and iron ￿rms, 12 telegraph ￿rms, 20 gas and electric ￿rms, and
10two mines. By value the banks comprise around 7% of the index, railways 58%, breweries
7%, commercial and industrial ￿rms 8%, coal and iron ￿rms 4%, telegraph ￿rms 3%, gas
and electric ￿rms 5%, and mines 4%. The average value of the equities included in our
market index (where the average is calculated from 1895 through 1905 is £548 million. By
value this is a little over 60% of the London market, so we are con￿dent our market index is
representative.6
Our sample consists of 469 ￿rms that were in existence part, or all, of the time between
1895 and 1905. Of these 469 ￿rms, 134 were o¢ cially listed on the London Stock Exchange
whereas 335 companies were traded informally on a ￿ supplementary list￿(see Franks, Mayer,
and Rossi (2006)).7 We hereafter refer to these companies as ￿ unlisted￿ . Most of our analysis
concerns the subsample of listed companies, unlisted companies will provide a useful control
group.
Descriptive statistics for the companies in our data set are provided in Table 1. While the
pro￿tability of the two types of companies, measured as return on equity, ROE, is similar,
companies quoted in the o¢ cial list were far larger and about twice as old (measured from
a company￿ s date of incorporation) as the unlisted companies. We follow De Angelo et al.
(2006) and compute the earned equity to ordinary equity ratio, measured as any earnings
not previously distributed to shareholders divided by nominal ordinary equity. We use this
measure as a proxy of the maturity of the company, with the idea that companies at a more
advanced stage of their life cycle should have accumulated a larger amount of reserves. We
￿nd that o¢ cially listed companies had a substantially higher earned to contributed capital
ratio than unlisted companies.
6The value of the entire London equity market is given as £887 million by Hannah (2007a). He uses the
￿gures of Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002).
7In contrast to most modern ￿nancial data sets we include public utilities such as electricity suppliers as
no regulations determined the amount of their dividend payments.
11IV Results
A Payout Ratio
We reconstruct the dividend histories of all 469 ￿rms for each year that the ￿rm was in
existence between 1895 and 1905 and when the balance sheet was found in the Guildhall
Library. We compute the payout ratio for each company, i, as 1
T
P Dividendst
Earningst , for each year,
t, that the company had positive earnings. We then take an unweighted average of all ￿rms
in the same industry. The results are presented in Table 2 where we display payout ratios
for all classes of equity and then payout ratios for the ordinary or residual equity.8 Railways
have the highest dividend payout ratios, paying out close to 90% of all pro￿ts. Other
old, established British industries, such as breweries and textiles, paid out over 80% of all
pro￿ts. Emerging industries such as electricity suppliers, cycles, and engineering retained a
greater share of their earnings. This may indicate that emerging industries had a need to
increase their capital stock through retained earnings. The equally weighted ￿gure across
all industries is 73%, much higher than contemporary U.S. payout ￿gures of around 25%









Earningsi;t , which includes ￿rms with negative earnings and gives greater weight to the
larger ￿rms, then the payout ratio rises to 92%. This is a slightly higher payout ratio
than for U.S. corporations in the 1990s which was 85%, made up of 58% as dividends and
27% as repurchases. Contemporary small U.S. ￿rms tend not to make any distributions of
earnings, whereas even small young 20th century British ￿rms tended to distribute much
of their earnings to shareholders. On balance these results suggest that, although younger
U.K. ￿rms needed to retain a portion of their earnings to ￿nance their investment projects,
obtaining external ￿nance was substantially easier than it currently is for start-up U.S. ￿rms.
8The residual claimant on a company￿ s cash ￿ ow was usually denoted as ￿ ordinary￿equity. However, for
some companies it was denoted ￿ deferred￿ , ￿ deferred ordinary￿ , and once ￿ preferred￿ .
12B Announcement E⁄ect
We use an event study method to assess the impact of dividend announcements on returns.
For each dividend announcement we calculate the abnormal return on ordinary/residual
equity as:
rj;ann = Rj;ann ￿ b aj;ann +b bj;annRm;ann (1)
where Rj;ann is the actual return of security j and Rm;ann is the actual return on the market.
We estimate aj;ann and bj;ann with the market model using weekly data from 18 months before
to 6 months after the dividend announcement, excluding the week preceding and following
the announcement:9
Rj;ann = aj;ann + bj;annRm;ann + ej;ann: (2)
We use our weekly London index to calculate the market return around each announcement
date, Rm;ann.
We average the abnormal returns over all N securities (that ￿t certain criteria and) and







We cumulate the average abnormal returns (AAR) from one week before to one week after
the dividend announcement to calculate the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR).
To discriminate between di⁄erent theories of dividend policy, we examine the e⁄ect of
dividend increases (or commencements), and decreases (or omissions), on security returns.
We are forced to restrict our sample to the 134 companies that were o¢ cially listed on the
London Stock Exchange (and therefore appear in the SEDOL) and between January 1895
and December 1905 had at least one dividend announcement that we can identify as an
increase, commencement, reduction, omission or continuation at the same rate. We observe
the prices and dividends of these companies from January 1893 through December 1907.
Companies almost always paid two dividends per year, an interim dividend paid partway
9We try both shorter and longer estimation windows. Our results are not a⁄ected by the choice of the
estimation window.
13through the company￿ s bookkeeping year, and a ￿nal dividend paid after the bookkeeping
year was complete. A handful of ￿rms paid annual dividends or quarterly dividends. The
interim dividend was usually kept constant from year to year, when a company decided to cut
or increase the dividend it would usually change the ￿nal dividend. We classify a dividend
announcement as an increase (decrease) if the announced dividend less the dividend paid 12
months prior to the announcement is positive (negative).
These 134 ￿rms made a total of 1512 ￿nal dividend announcements. We ￿nd announce-
ments of 26 dividend omissions, 290 dividend cuts (together 20.9% of all announcements),
766 unchanged dividends (50.7% of all announcements), 396 dividend increases, and 34 divi-
dend initiations (together 28.4%). We present the CAAR results in Table 3. Announcements
of dividend increases or commencements are associated with positive CAARs of 1.4%, sig-
ni￿cant at the 1% level. Announcements of commencements or increases of more than 10%
are associated with positive CAARs of 1.7%, signi￿cant at the 1% level. Announcements
of dividend decreases or omissions are associated with negative CAARs of 2.0%, whereas
omissions or decreases of more than 10% are associated with CAARs of 2.4%, both of which
are signi￿cant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with an asymmetric information
story, whereby dividend announcements are conveying information about future earnings to
shareholders. Our results reject the argument that dividends only signal information be-
cause they are (in some jurisdictions) tax disadvantaged (see Bhattacharya (1979), John and
Williams (1985), and Bernheim (1991). We ￿nd support for the ￿ndings of Amihud and
Murgia (1997), that dividend changes can provide signals to investors, even if dividends are
tax neutral.
According to Lang and Litzenberger (1989), if agency considerations are important, div-
idend announcements will di⁄erentially a⁄ect di⁄erent types of ￿rms. We split ￿rms along
three dimensions: Tobin￿ s Q, earned to total equity, and age. We calculate the CAAR for
each subset of ￿rms in Table 4. Firms with a value of Tobin￿ s Q less than one (those with
fewer pro￿table uses for retained earnings) experience a greater drop in share prices (more
negative CAAR) when announcements of dividend cuts are made than ￿rms with Tobin￿ s Q
greater than or equal to one, although the di⁄erence in e⁄ects is not statistically signi￿cant.
14We interpret this as weak evidence of agency e⁄ects. There is almost no di⁄erence in e⁄ects
for announcements of dividend increases. Firms with a lower earned to ordinary equity ratio
are a⁄ected more by announcements of dividend increases or decreases, but again the e⁄ect is
not statistically signi￿cant. Younger ￿rms are a⁄ected more by announcements of dividend
increases or decreases, again not statistically signi￿cant (except for dividend increases at the
10% level). If agency e⁄ects were important we would expect older ￿rms to be punished
more in the stock market for cutting dividends, and rewarded more for increasing them - we
￿nd the reverse. We do not ￿nd any serious support for agency theories from examining the
e⁄ect of dividend announcements on security returns. This result suggests that taxes are
necessary for companies to be able to use dividends to resolve agency problems.
We next regress individual cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each ￿rm-announcement
on ￿rm characteristics:







+￿4DividendY ieldi + ￿5Controlsi + ei;t:
ROE is a ￿rm￿ s total earnings before depreciation divided by total equity; DIV is a ￿rm￿ s
dividend paid, Pt￿1 is the market price of ordinary equity the day before the dividend
announcement, and SIZE is the natural logarithm of a ￿rm￿ s assets. We use age, the
earned to total equity ratio, Tobin￿ s Q, and following Yoon and Starks (1995), the dividend
yield and ￿rm size as controls. We report the results of the regression in Table 5. To control
for contemporaneous earnings announcements we include changes in pro￿tability, scaled by
price, in addition to current dividends changes, scaled by price.
We ￿nd that announcements of increased dividends and increased earnings have separate
and positive e⁄ects on a ￿rm￿ s cumulative abnormal return. The magnitude of the e⁄ect of
dividend changes on abnormal returns is important: a one standard deviation increase in
￿
DIVi;t
Pi;t￿1 leads to a 1 percentage point CAR increase. The positive and independent e⁄ect of
dividend changes on abnormal returns is consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis.
We do not ￿nd that any of the controls are statistically signi￿cant. In particular, contrary
to the predictions of the agency hypothesis, measures of maturity of the company are not
15statistically signi￿cant. The results show that dividend changes produce a sizable reaction in
stock prices, beyond the e⁄ects of the information contained in earnings changes. This test
also supports the notion that taxes are not a ￿rst order element to de￿ne the information
content of dividends, however taxes seem to be an important factor to resolve agency issues.
C Dividend Changes and Future Pro￿tability
Following the methods of Bernartzi et al. (1997), Nissim and Ziv (2001), Grullon et al.
(2005) and Michaely and Roberts (2007), we now assess whether investors reacted rationally
to announcements of dividend increases (decreases) by driving share prices higher (lower). In
particular we test whether future earnings changes could have been predicted from changes
in dividends, which would lend additional support to the dividend signaling hypothesis. We
run the following partial adjustment model:
(ROEi;t+n ￿ ROEi;t) = ￿0 + ￿1(DNCi;t ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
DIVi;t ￿ DIVi;t￿1
DIVi;t￿1
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) (5)
+￿2(DPCi;t ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
DIVi;t ￿ DIVi;t￿1
DIVi;t￿1
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + Controlsi;t + ei;t:
both in its linear (e.g. Nissim and Ziv (2001)) and non-linear version (e.g. Grullon et al.
(2005)). DNC is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the ￿rm has cut the dividend
from period t￿1 to period t, and 0 otherwise. DPC is a dummy variable that takes on the
value 1 if the ￿rm has increased the dividend from period t￿1 to period t, and 0 otherwise.
We include controls for past levels and changes of ROE. In particular, ROE could be a
mean reverting process in which case high (low) past levels of ROE should be associated
with decreases (increases) in current and future earnings (see Nissim and Ziv (2001)). In
the non-linear version we also include squared adjustment terms for earnings, to capture the
non-linearities of earnings reversions that Grullon et al. (2005) and Fama and French (2000)
emphasize as crucial. We test if contemporaneous dividend changes can predict earnings
changes one year (n = 1) or two years (n = 2) in the future. We follow the approach
described in Petersen (2008) and cluster the standard errors by ￿rm. We report the results
in Table 6.
16We ￿nd that we can achieve predictive power by using negative and positive dividend
announcements to forecast earnings one year ahead. Dividend cuts are associated with de-
creases in earnings in the following year, statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level. Dividend
increases are associated with increases in earnings the following year, statistically signi￿cant
at the 5% level.10 Past ROE has a negative coe¢ cient, which gives support to the notion that
earnings were mean reverting. The coe¢ cients on the change in earnings is also negative,
which provides further support for mean reversion - ￿rms that experienced an increase (de-
crease) in earnings in one year are more likely to experience a decrease (increase) in earnings
in the current year. We ￿nd little evidence that dividends or earnings can predict changes in
earnings two years or more (unreported) in the future. These results strengthen our conclu-
sion that asymmetric information is playing the major role in explaining the dividend policy
of ￿rms. Firms that announce a dividend increase (decrease) experience positive (negative)
cumulative abnormal returns, and the increases (decreases) of dividends are associated with
higher (lower) earnings one year in the future.
We also investigate Nissim and Ziv￿ s (2001) idea that dividend changes can predict earn-
ings levels (rather than changes in earnings) using the procedure of Grullon et al (2005). We
￿nd that dividend decreases are associated with a lower ROE one year ahead, statistically
signi￿cant at the 5% level in both a linear and non-linear model. We do not ￿nd a robust
correlation between dividend increases and the level of earnings one year in the future. In
addition we do not ￿nd any evidence that earnings levels two or more years in the future
can be predicted by dividend changes.11
Finally, we assess whether our inclusion of dividends in (5) increases the model￿ s predic-
tive power. As in Grullon et al. (2005) (pages 1675-76) we follow the technique of Giacomini
and White (2006). The technique consists of forecasting ROE one or two years ahead using
only the the information available at that time (ie. no ￿ look ahead￿bias). ROE is forecast
using (5) both with, and without, the dividend variables. The forecast error of each earnings
level n years ahead, fn, is calculated as ROEt+n ￿ \ ROEt+n. Di⁄erences in squared and
10The results are similar, albeit slightly weaker, if we exclude outlying observations using Cook￿ s D criterion
and the method of Hadi.
11Results are available upon request.






dAD = jfDIVj ￿ jfNODIVj:
We construct mean squared errors (MSE) and mean absolute deviations and we bootstrap
their associated standard errors. We present our ￿ndings in Table 7. In contrast to Grullon
et al. we ￿nd that forecasting models that include dividends outperform models that exclude
dividends one and two years ahead. Dividends were useful information for turn of the century
investors to forecast a company￿ s future earnings.
D To pay or not to pay
We next investigate the characteristics of companies that paid dividends. If agency expla-
nations of dividends are relevant, measures of a company￿ s maturity should be associated
with the company￿ s propensity to pay dividends. In particular, older companies, companies
with higher earned to total equity, and companies with a lower Tobin￿ s Q should have been
more likely to pay a dividend and should have had higher payout ratios. Fama and French
(2001) document that in the U.S. during the period 1963-98 the ￿rms that paid dividends
were, on average, more pro￿table, had fewer investment opportunities (a lower market to
book value, ie. Tobin￿ s Q), and were larger than non-dividend payers. DeAngelo, DeAngelo,
and Stulz (2006) ￿nd that, in addition to the variables identi￿ed by Fama and French, life
cycle considerations are important. Firms that have a high ratio of earned equity to total
equity are likely to be those in the mature stage of their life cycle, and are much more likely
to distribute earnings as dividends.
We run a logit regression with a dummy variable equal to one if the company paid a
dividend that year and equal to zero otherwise as the dependent variable:
Payi;t = ￿1ROEi;t + ￿2ROEi;t￿1 + ￿3SIZEi;t + ￿4AGEi;t + ￿5ETOTi;t + ￿6OTOTi;t(6)
+￿7CASHi;t + ￿8Qi;t + ￿9EASSi;t + ￿7PREVi;t + Controls + ei;t
ROE is the return on equity, SIZE is the natural logarithm of a company￿ s total assets, AGE
18is the number of years since incorporation, ETOT is any earnings not previously distributed
as dividends to shareholders divided by nominal ordinary equity, CASH is cash divided by
assets, OTOT is nominal ordinary equity divided by total assets, Q is the book value of debt
plus the market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets, EASS is
any earnings not previously distributed to shareholders divided by total assets, and PREV
is a dummy variable that equals one if the company did not pay an ordinary dividend in the
previous year, and zero otherwise. We also include year and industry dummies. We present
our results in Table 8.
We ￿nd that the most important determinants of the propensity to pay a dividend are
contemporaneous pro￿tability and immediate past pro￿tability. The coe¢ cient on ROE is
positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level in speci￿cations 1 through 5. In terms of
economic signi￿cance the e⁄ect is quite important: a company of average size that increases
its ROE from the ￿rst to the third quantile would increase its probability of paying dividends
from about 76% to about 93%. We do not ￿nd a clear relation between either age or size
and the probability a ￿rm pays a dividend.
Consistent with DeAngelo et al. (2006), we ￿nd that a higher ratio of earned to total
equity is associated with a higher probability of paying dividends (although this is not
statistically signi￿cant). The result holds if we substitute earned equity to total assets in
place of earned to contributed capital (columns 3). Firms with a higher ratio of cash to
assets are more likely to pay a dividend, although the estimates have marginal statistical
signi￿cance. In addition, we ￿nd that ￿rms were dividend smoothing at this time, although
markedly less than today￿ s ￿rms are. We run a Lintner smoothing model of dividends. We
￿nd that ￿rms in our sample have a dividend adjustment speed of 0.82 that is substantially
higher than estimates found with contemporary data, e.g. 0.21 in the U.S. between 1984 and
2002 (see Brav et al. (2005)) and 0.41 in the U.K. between 1993 and 2002 (see Michaely and
Roberts (2007)). We also ￿nd that a ￿rm￿ s target payout ratio was about 44%, higher than
the 22% found by Brav et al (2005) and the 21% reported by Michaely and Roberts (2007).
We ￿nd that a ￿rm with a higher Tobin￿ s Q is associated with a higher probability of
being a dividend payer. This is similar to what Denis and Osobov (2008) ￿nd for France and
19Germany in the 1990s and 2000s. We suspect that multicollinearity between the return on
equity, Tobin￿ s Q, and whether or not a ￿rm paid a dividend last year is in￿ uencing these
results somewhat. Firms that paid a dividend last year are more likely to be pro￿table ￿rms
and have a high share price (hence Tobin￿ s Q as we measure it). When we add a dummy
variable for a previous dividend payer (column 7 of Table 8) the estimated coe¢ cients and
t-stats on ROE and Tobin￿ s Q move towards zero.
To summarize, contemporaneous pro￿tability is very important in a ￿rm￿ s decision of
whether or not to pay a dividend, ￿rms are dividend smoothing from year to year, and ￿rms
with a higher proportion of earned equity to total equity are more likely to pay a dividend.
We then run Tobit models of a company￿ s payout ratio on various explanatory variables.
We present our results in Table 9. Pro￿tability, in particular the previous year￿ s ROE
is a major determinant of companies￿ordinary payout levels. An increase of one standard
deviation in the previous year￿ s ROE leads to an 11 percentage point increase in the ordinary
equity payout ratio. As in the Logit analysis, this result supports the idea that companies
were smoothing dividends from one year to another. Tobin￿ s Q has a positive and statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cient in all the speci￿cations. However, its economic signi￿cance is not
big: a one standard deviation increase of Tobin￿ s Q leads to an increase in the ordinary
payout ratio of 1 percentage point. The coe¢ cients associated with the other measures of
maturity, AGE and ETOT, are positive and usually statistically signi￿cant. The economic
signi￿cance of these measures is moderate. A one standard deviation increase in ETOT is
associated with an increase of 6 percentage points in the ordinary payout ratio. Similarly,
a one standard deviation increase in AGE (17 years) is associated with an increase in the
ordinary payout ratio of 5 percentage points. Although we ￿nd some evidence that measures
of a company￿ s maturity are relevant, pro￿tability has a larger impact on the payout ratio.
Agency explanations do not seem to have been an important driver of dividend policies,
which supports the idea that, in the absence of taxes, dividends are an unattractive method
to resolve agency problems.
20E Resolving the Agency Problem
Although we do not ￿nd evidence that more mature companies paid higher dividends, one
method to alleviate agency problems, we ￿nd evidence of alternative strategies. More mature
companies restricted their manager￿ s borrowing powers, and dealt with more banks (potential
monitors) than did less mature companies.
We collect information from the Stock Exchange O¢ cial Intelligence in 1896, 1897, 1901,
and 1902 on the companies in our sample. We ￿nd that a one standard deviation increase in
ETOT reduces managers￿discretionary borrowing power, measured as loans permitted by
the articles of association without a vote at the AGM divided by nominal ordinary equity,
by about 20%. We ￿nd this variable is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level in a simple
regression.
We also examine the existence of multiple bank relationships for our ￿rms. A ￿rm that
has an association with more than one bank is more likely to be monitored closely, and has at
least partially solved its agency problems. We run a logit model with the dependent variable
equal to one if a ￿rm a more than one bank relationship and zero otherwise. If we consider
a ￿rm that moves from the ￿rst to the third quintile of ETOT we ￿nd the probability of
having multiple bank relationships increases from 27% to 37%.12
We believe that shareholders alleviated the inherent agency problem they faced by cur-
tailing manager￿ s borrowing powers and using multiple banks to monitor their managers
rather than by paying out higher dividends.
12We think it is unlikely that this result is driven by ￿rms￿desires to resolve a hold up problem as in
Sharpe (1990). The Sharpe model predicts that asymmetric information problems between borrowers and a
single lender are resolved over time in a relationship that creates an informational advantage for the lender.
Such an informational advantage can be exploited to extract rents. As a result, young and less well-known
￿rms may engage multiple banks to avoid later hold-ups. Our results suggest that more mature and better
known companies, in principle ￿rms that should su⁄er fewer hold up problems, were more likely to display
multiple bank relationships.
21V O¢ cially Listed and Unlisted Companies
We now examine the behaviour of the 335 unlisted ￿rms. These are all ￿rms for which we
observe accounting data, but not market values of equity (since they do not appear in the
SEDOL). These ￿rms were all public, limited companies; our data set does not contain any
private, family-held ￿rms. If unlisted ￿rms were more closely held with a smaller shareholder
base then we would expect little correlation between dividends and future earnings. Managers
of unlisted ￿rms would not need to raise or lower dividends to credibly convey information
about future earnings to shareholders.
Table 10 examines the e⁄ect of dividend announcements on future earnings changes. We
￿nd that announcements of dividend decreases are useful to predict negative changes in
earnings in the following year (columns 1 and 2).13 Announcements of dividend increases
are not robustly associated with increased earnings in the following year. We ￿nd that
dividend announcements have little information content for earnings two (columns 3 and
4) or more (unreported) years in the future. The control variables indicate that earnings
of unlisted ￿rms are mean reverting, as they are for listed ￿rms. We ￿nd little evidence
of di⁄erences between listed and unlisted ￿rms, asymmetric information problems appear
to have existed in both classes of ￿rms. Dividend announcements were a way of conveying
private information from managers to shareholders.
Table 11 presents our results for the examination of the decision on whether or not to
pay a dividend for unlisted ￿rms. In most of the cases, we obtain very similar coe¢ cient
estimates for listed and unlisted ￿rms. Contemporaneous pro￿tability and the previous year￿ s
pro￿tability were important determinants of the dividend payment decision for both classes
of ￿rms. Life cycle considerations were marginally more important for unlisted ￿rms - they
are more likely to pay dividends if they are larger and have more earned equity. Shareholders
of unlisted ￿rms may have been more concentrated and therefore have had more power over
managers. Consequently shareholders may have found it easier to discipline managers of
older, more mature companies into paying dividends.
13The results are weaker if we exclude outliers.
22We examine the determinants of the payout ratios of unlisted ￿rms in Table 12. We ￿nd
that unlisted ￿rms with higher pro￿ts, higher earned equity, more cash, which were older,
were more likely to pay out more of their pro￿ts as dividends in a year. In addition, ￿rms
that did not pay a dividend in the previous year were likely to have had a lower payout ratio,
all else equal. We test if there are statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences between the coe¢ cient
estimates of listed and unlisted companies. The coe¢ cients on past ROE are bigger for
listed ￿rms and the di⁄erence with unlisted ￿rms is statistically signi￿cant. However, the
economic importance of this di⁄erence is small: a one standard deviation increase in past
ROE for listed companies leads to a 12 percentage point increase in the ordinary payout
ratio. A one standard deviation increase of past ROE for unlisted companies leads to a 11
percentage point increase in the ordinary payout ratio. Cash appears to be a more important
determinant of the payout level for unlisted ￿rms. This evidence works again agency theories
of dividends: managers of listed companies should have been more careful to disburse any
excess cash to shareholders than unlisted companies if they wished to show investors that
resources were not being wasted. In contrast to Michaely and Roberts (2007) we do not
￿nd much di⁄erence in the dividend smoothing behaviour of these classes of ￿rms (Tables
8 and 11) nor their payout ratio (Tables 9 and 12). We run the Lintner model (as used by
Michaely and Roberts (2007)) to estimate the speed of adjustment parameter of dividends.
We estimate the speed of adjustment parameter to be 0.81 for listed companies and 0.82
for unlisted companies, close to Michaely and Roberts￿estimate of 0.89 for wholly owned
privately traded ￿rms, and roughly double their estimate for contemporary U.K. public ￿rms,
0.41. In other words, our ￿rms are smoothing dividends far less than contemporary U.K.
public ￿rms. Michaely and Roberts conclude that: ￿the scrutiny of public equity markets
appears to induce managers to follow a policy of relatively small, consistent increases in
dividends, while avoiding any decrease in dividends.￿However, we suggest that taxes (and
possibly the associated agency e⁄ects) may be driving their results, in line with the ￿ndings
of Amihud and Murgia (1997). In conclusion, we ￿nd few di⁄erences in the payout policy
between ￿rms o¢ cially listed on the London Stock Exchange and those ￿rms not o¢ cially
listed there.
23VI Conclusion
We examine the dividend policy of ￿rms in the unregulated, very low tax regime of turn
of the 20th century Britain. In this environment we examine the importance of taxes for
signaling and agency based models of dividend policy. We ￿nd strong support for signaling
(asymmetric information) theories of dividend policy, and little support for agency models.
This result suggests that taxes are unnecessary for clear signals to be sent from managers to
shareholders via dividends. However, taxes appear to be necessary for dividends to resolve
agency problems between managers and shareholders.
Dividend cuts appear to convey bad news to shareholders, and ￿rms that announced div-
idend cuts or omissions su⁄ered an abnormal return of around -2.0%. Firms that announced
dividend raises or commencements achieved an abnormal return of around 1.4% around the
time of the announcement. There do not appear to have been di⁄erences between classes of
￿rms (grouped by age, earned to total equity, or Tobin￿ s Q) in their responses to dividend
announcements. In addition we ￿nd that changes in dividends were associated with changes
in earnings in the same direction one year out. Changes in dividends did not appear to signal
earnings changes two or more years in the future.
In addition we ￿nd that ￿rms paid out around 90% of current earnings as dividends,
a similar ￿gure to contemporary American ￿rms. An important di⁄erence is that younger
U.K. ￿rms were almost as likely to pay dividends as older ￿rms. More pro￿table ￿rms were
more likely to pay a dividend and ￿rms smoothed their dividends.
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28#  Obs. Mean  Median Std. Deviation #  Obs. Mean  Median Std. Deviation
Return on Equity 134 0.089 0.078 0.06 335 0.084 0.076 0.072
Total Assets 134 7533.35 916.39 19867 335 424.9 193.27 1025.7
Age 134 20.27 13 17.39 335 10.98 6.42 10.43
Earned to Ordinary 134 0.131 0.039 0.226 335 0.082 0.007 0.171
Ordinary Equity to Total Assets 134 0.486 0.445 0.203 335 0.48 0.45 0.208
Cash over Assets 134 0.094 0.056 0.118 335 0.073 0.043 0.094
Tobin's Q 134 1.21 1.022 0.921 n.a n.a n.a
Table I
Return on equity is total earnings before depreciation divided by total nominal equity. Total assets is measured in '000s of pounds.
Age is the number of years since a company was incorporated. Earned to Ordinary is any earnings that the company had not
previously distributed as dividends divided by nominal ordinary equity. Ordinary Equity to Total Assets is nominal ordinary equity
divided by total assets. Cash to assets is total cash balances (including financial investments) divided by total assets. Tobin's Q is
(book value of debt +  book value of preference equity + market value of common equity) / (book value of total assets).
Officially Listed on London Stock Exchange Not Officially Listed on London Stock Exchange









Breweries 46 0.898 82 0.832 0.552
Cycles 52 0.734 0.475 213 0.650 0.432
Electricity 199 0.792 0.618 241 0.728 0.596
Iron and Steel 71 0.789 0.671 183 0.771 0.438
Railways 234 0.927 0.333 62 0.752 0.354
Telegraph, Telephones 100 0.716 0.620 4 0.220 0.170
Mines 79 0.730 0.589 258 0.736 0.573
Textiles 88 0.876 0.601 404 0.843 0.554
Paper Manufacturing 31 0.875 0.502 210 0.808 0.573
Engineering 57 0.732 0.680 237 0.722 0.536
Chemicals 121 0.819 0.585 306 0.772 0.443
Tobacco 27 0.918 0.622 44 0.938 0.656
0.826
(# obs. = 1105)
0.551
(# obs. = 1007)
0.766
(# obs. = 2244)
0.520
(# obs. = 2225)
0.915
(# obs. = 1155)
0.497
(# obs. = 1051)
0.819
(# obs. = 2494)
0.568
(# obs. = 2472)
0.787
(# obs. = 3349)
0.527
(# obs. = 3232)
0.896
(# obs. = 3649)
0.500
(# obs. = 3523)
All Firms (Listed & not Listed)
(Sum of all Dividends
/ Sum of all Earnings)
We calculate the average dividends to earnings ratio over time for each company that reports positive earnings. In
the first and fourth columns we report the number of observations (company-years)in an industry. In the second and
fifth columns we report the unweighted average payout ratio across all companies in an industry. The dividend
payout includes all classes of equity. In the third and sixth columns we report the unweighted average payout ratio,
but only include the dividend payout of ordinary equity. We separate firms into those officially listed on the London
Stock Exchange and those not officially listed in London.
Average Dividend Payout Ratio by Industry (1895-1905)
Table II
Listed on London Stock Exchange Not Listed on London Stock Exchange







(Sum of all Dividends
/ Sum of all Earnings)All announcements Omissions, Commencements and Changes > 10%
Increases and Commencements 0.014*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.003)
Observations 430 357
Average Size of Increases + 40% + 48%
Decreases and Omissions -0.020*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.005)
Observations 316 259
Average Size of Decreases -33% -39%
Dividend Announcement Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR)
Table III
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns as a security's return from 1 week before a dividend announcement to
1 week after the announcement less the security's return given by the market model over the same period. We
then average the cumulative abnormal returns across securities. We split the sample along two dimensions. The
first dimension is whether the dividend announcement marked an increase (or commencement), decrease (or
omission), or a dividend at the same rate. The second dimension is by the size of the dividend change. The first
column includes all increases and commencements (decreases and omissions), the second column only includes
increases of more than 10% (and all commencements) and decreases of more than 10% (and all omissions).
Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in parentheses.Dividend Decrease Dividend Increase
Tobin's Q >= 1 -0.014*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 150 225
Tobin's Q < 1 -0.027*** 0.014***
(0.007) (0.003)
Observations 116 231
t-stat of difference in means 1.30 -0.29
Earned to Ordinary >= Median -0.013** 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 129 124
Earned to Ordinary < Median -0.022*** 0.017***
(0.007) (0.003)
Observations 138 247
t-stat of difference in means 1.36 -1.23
Age >= Median -0.013*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 169 199
Age < Median -0.025*** 0.018***
(0.009) (0.004)
Observations 134 216
t-stat of difference in means 1.32 -1.67
Dividend Announcement CAARs by Firm Characteristics
Table IV
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns as a security's return from 1 week before a dividend announcement
to 1 week after the announcement less the security's expected return from the market model over the same
period. We then average the cumulative abnormal returns across securities. We split securities by three
characteristics - Tobin's Q, Earned to Ordinary, and Age. Tobin's Q is (book value of debt + book value of
preference equity + market value of common equity) / (book value of total assets). Earned to Ordinary is any
earnings that the company had not previously distributed as dividends divided by nominal ordinary equity.
Age is the number of years since the firm was incorporated. t-stats of differences in mean dividend
announcement effects are calculated between the groups of high and low firms as sorted by Tobin's Q,
Earned to Ordinary, and Age respectively. Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in parentheses.123456
ΔEarnings/Pricet-1 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ΔDiv/Pricet-1 0.5100** 0.4904* 0.4938* 0.4930* 0.4833* 0.4942*
(0.2445) (0.2657) (0.2680) (0.2726) (0.2626) (0.2678)
Dividend Yield -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Size -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0019
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Age 0.000
(0.0001)




Observations 502 440 425 405 408 425
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
The dependent variable is a company's cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from one week before to one week after
an announcement of a year-end dividend increase, decrease, commencement, or omission. ΔEarnings/Price is the
difference in earnings between the current and the previous earnings announcement divided by the share price of
one week before the current dividend announcement. ΔDiv/Price is the difference between the current and the
previous dividend divided by the share price of one week before the current announcement. Dividend Yield is the
total ordinary dividend payments divided by the ordinary share price at the end of the previous year. Size is the
natural logarithm of a company's total assets. Age is the number of years since a company was incorporated.
Earned to Ordinary is any earnings that the company had not previously distributed as dividends divided by
nominal ordinary equity. Tobin's Q is (book value of debt + book value of preference equity + market value of
common equity) / (book value of total assets). Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in parentheses.
The Influence of Firm Characteristics on announcement CARs
Table VLinear Model Yes No Yes No
NEGINT -0.018* -0.016* 0.015 -0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007)
POSINT 0.008** 0.008** -0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Return on Equity (lagged) -0.077* -0.056
(0.042) (0.040)






























Observations 588 470 474 372
R
2 0.09 0.19 0.04 0.10
The dependent variable is the change in a firm's return on equity (ROE) from year t to t+1 or t+2. Return on equity
is total earnings before depreciation divided by total nominal equity. We control for year fixed effects. NEGINT is
defined as (DNC * % Δ OrdDivs) where DNC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has cut the ordinary
dividend between year t-1 and year t. % Δ OrdDivs is the percentage change in the ordinary dividend rate between
year t-1 and year t. POSINT is defined as (DPC * % Δ OrdDivs) where DPC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm has increased the ordinary dividend between year t-1 and year t. We only consider dividend changes of more
than 10%. ROEt-1 is total earnings before depreciation in year t-1 divided by total nominal equity in year t-1.
ΔEarnings is defined as ROEt less ROEt-1. E(ROE) is the expected return on equity defined as the predicted value
from a regression of ROE on the lagged value of the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q, the natural logarithm of total
assets and the lagged value of ROE. [x+] and [x-] denote the max (min) of zero and x. Standard errors are clustered
by firm and appear in parentheses.
Can Dividend Changes predict Earnings Changes?
Table VI
Earnings Changes 1 year in the future Earnings Changes 2 years in the future1 year ahead 2 years ahead




















Out of Sample Ability of Dividends to Predict Earnings
Table VII
We use the technique of Grullon et al. (2005) to compute mean squared forecast errors
(MSE) and mean absolute deviation (MAD) forecast errors for a model that includes
dividend announcements (DIV) and a model that excludes dividend announcements
(NODIV). Errors for each earnings observation are calculated as fDIV -f NODIV, where fDIV is
the difference between actual earnings (1 or 2 years ahead) and forecast earnings (1 or 2
years ahead). Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in parentheses.1234567
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Return on Equity 52.347*** 32.130** 31.881** 35.457** 35.471** 29.129 22.715
(13.397) (15.414) (15.570) (16.270) (17.794) (20.600) (21.845)
Return on Equityt-1 27.513*** 27.043*** 26.312*** 30.275*** 15.518 16.716
(9.625) (9.606) (9.087) (10.096) (10.117) (11.867)
Size 0.015 0.035 0.072 0.116 0.129 0.105 0.066
(0.140) (0.142) (0.144) (0.166) (0.169) (0.132) (0.174)
Age 0.022* 0.021 0.018 0.01 0.016 0.015 0.02
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014)
Earned to Ordinary 3.346* 2.251 2.029 2.21 1.102 0.755
(2.006) (1.493) (1.906) (2.048) (1.262) (1.709)
Ordinary Equity to Total Assets 0.899 1.475 1.211 2.838** 2.648** 2.812** 3.327**
(1.119) (1.227) (1.235) (1.271) (1.273) (1.116) (1.511)
Cash over Assets 1.802 0.253 0.313 -0.01 0.327 -2.274 -0.094
(1.496) (1.889) (1.890) (2.499) (2.428) (2.433) (2.974)
Tobin's Q 2.253*
(1.320)
Earned Eq to Total Assets 7.529
(5.611)
Previous non Payer -3.487*** -3.056***
(0.583) (0.630)
Wald Chi
2 32.18 35.96 34.80 94.87 144.38 161.33 199.68
Observations 1022 845 847 789 789 770 711
The dependent variable equals one if the company paid any dividend on its ordinary equity in the year, and zero
otherwise. The estimates are obtained from a logit regression. Return on equity is total earnings before depreciation
divided by total nominal equity. Size is the natural logarithm of a company's total assets. Age is the number of years
since incorporation. Earned to Ordinary is any earnings not previously distributed as dividends divided by nominal
ordinary equity. Ordinary Equity to Total Assets is nominal ordinary equity divided by total assets. Cash to assets is
total cash balances (including financial investments) divided by total assets. Tobin's Q is (book value of debt +
book value of preference equity + market value of common equity) / (book value of total assets). Earned equity to
total assets is any earnings not previously distributed to shareholders divided by total assets. Previous non payer is a
dummy variable that equals one if the company did not pay an ordinary dividend in the previous year, and equal to
zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in parentheses.
Whether or not to pay a dividend
Table VIII1234567
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Return on Equity 0.721*** -0.026 -0.105 -0.003 -0.037 -0.218 -0.203
(0.140) (0.176) (0.176) (0.174) (0.173) (0.160) (0.151)
Return on Equity t-1 1.572*** 1.580*** 1.583*** 1.570*** 0.934*** 1.040***
(0.200) (0.195) (0.198) (0.198) (0.186) (0.175)
Log Size -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Earned to Ordinary 0.355*** 0.242*** 0.196*** 0.209*** 0.104* 0.078
(0.053) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.057) (0.054)
Ordinary Equity to Total Assets 0.645*** 0.698*** 0.591*** 0.777*** 0.749*** 0.626*** 0.560***
(0.076) (0.083) (0.079) (0.087) (0.087) (0.082) (0.080)
Cash over Assets 0.135 0.002 -0.12 -0.022 -0.003 -0.07 -0.022
(0.110) (0.124) (0.128) (0.133) (0.134) (0.122) (0.115)
Tobin's Q 0.029***
(0.011)
Earned Eq to Total Assets 0.909***
(0.166)
Previous non Payer -0.564*** -0.508***
(0.039) (0.038)
Likelihood Ratio Test Chi
2 201.29 228.85 246.05 289.54 300.57 508.70 510.20
Observations 1018 841 843 841 841 821 755
The dependent variable is the ratio ordinary dividends to earnings. The estimates are obtained from a tobit model.
Return on equity is total earnings before depreciation divided by total nominal equity. Log Size is the natural
logarithm of a company's total assets. Age is the number of years since a company was incorporated. Earned to
Ordinary is any earnings not previously distributed to shareholders divided by nominal ordinary equity. Ordinary
Equity to Total Assets is nominal ordinary equity divided by total assets. Cash to assets is total cash balances
(including financial investments) divided by total assets. Tobin's Q is (book value of debt + book value of
preference equity + market value of common equity) / (book value of total assets). Earned Equity to Total Assets is
any earnings not previously distributed as dividends to shareholders divided by total assets. Previous non payer is a
dummy variable equal to one if the company did not pay an ordinary dividend in the previous year, and equal to zero
otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in parentheses.
Determinants of the Dividend Payout Ratio
Table IXLinear Model Yes No Yes No
NEGINT -0.028** -0.012* 0.016 -0.005
(0.012) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
POSINT -0.002 0.00 0.00 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Return on Equity (lagged) -0.277** -0.138**
(0.115) (0.069)






























Observations 1184 1176 934 929
R
2 0.30 0.48 0.01 0.01
The dependent variable is the change in a firm's return on equity (ROE) from year t to t+1 or t+2. Return on
equity is total earnings before depreciation divided by total nominal equity. We control for year fixed effects.
NEGINT is defined as (DNC * % Δ OrdDivs) where DNC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has cut the
ordinary dividend between year t-1 and year t. % Δ OrdDivs is the percentage change in the ordinary dividend
rate between year t-1 and year t. POSINT is defined as (DPC * % Δ OrdDivs) where DPC is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm has increased the ordinary dividend between year t-1 and year t. ΔEarnings is defined as
ROEt less ROEt-1. E(ROE) is the expected return on equity defined as the predicted value from a regression of
ROE on the lagged value of the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q, the natural logarithm of total assets and the
lagged value of ROE. [x+] and [x-] denote the max (min) of zero and x. Standard errors are clustered by firm
and appear in parentheses.
Can Dividend Changes predict Earnings Changes?
Unlisted Companies
Table X
Earnings Changes 1 year in the future Earnings Changes 2 years in the future123456
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Return on Equity 34.016*** 30.347*** 30.336*** 31.107*** 31.516*** 34.648***
(4.955) (5.303) (5.232) (5.741) (5.936) (5.594)
Return on Equity (lagged) 0.289*** 0.347*** 0.349*** 0.231** 0.224* 0.248**
(0.102) (0.109) (0.109) (0.118) (0.119) (0.099)
Size -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.017 -0.015 -0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Age 3.235*** 3.208*** 3.562*** 3.622*** 2.499***
(0.732) (0.747) (0.775) (0.799) (0.735)
Earned to Ordinary 2.306*** 2.603*** 2.155*** 3.120*** 3.078*** 2.564***
(0.505) (0.555) (0.532) (0.674) (0.693) (0.614)
Ordinary Equity to Total Assets 1.594 1.026 1.175 2.004 2.338* 0.729
(1.089) (1.332) (1.327) (1.269) (1.278) (1.133)
Cash over Assets 8.399** 8.584** 8.444** 8.156** -0.124
(3.744) (3.711) (3.911) (4.018) (1.409)
Earned Equity to Total Assets 7.358***
(2.029)
Previous non Payer -2.730***
(0.242)
Wald Chi
2 86.40 81.72 75.62 112.75 117.57 397.17
Observations 2339 1868 1868 1868 1868 1833
The dependent variable equals one if the company paid any dividend on its ordinary equity int he year, and zero
otherwise. The estimates are obtained from a logit regression. Return on equity (ROE) is total earnings before
depreciation divided by total nominal equity. Size is the natural logarithm of a company's total assets. Age is the
number of years since incorporation. Earned to Ordinary is any earnings not previously distributed as dividends to
shareholders divided by nominal ordinary equity. Ordinary Equity to Total Assets is nominal ordinary equity divided
by total assets. Cash to assets is total cash balances (including financial investments) divided by total assets. Tobin's
Q is (book value of debt + book value of preference equity + market value of common equity) / (book value of total
assets). Earned Equity to Total Assets is any earnings that the company has not previously distributed as dividends
divided by total assets. Previous non payer is a dummy variable equal to one if the company did not pay an ordinary
dividend in the previous year, and equal to zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in
parentheses.
Whether or not to pay a dividend
Unlisted Companies
Table XI123456
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Return on Equity 1.176*** 0.829*** 0.824*** 0.799*** 0.758*** 0.313
(0.150) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.217)
Return on Equity (lagged) 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.048** 0.047** 0.023
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Log Size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.493*** 0.399*** 0.392*** 0.408*** 0.205**
(0.077) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.090)
Earned to Ordinary 0.822*** 0.907*** 0.810*** 0.969*** 0.935*** 0.758***
(0.090) (0.111) (0.106) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115)
Ordinary Equity to Total Assets 0.493*** 0.378* 0.359* 0.517** 0.568*** 0.296
(0.172) (0.206) (0.207) (0.206) (0.206) (0.200)
Cash over Assets 1.075*** 1.075*** 1.063*** 1.003*** 0.178
(0.189) (0.190) (0.189) (0.190) (0.191)
Earned Eq to Total Assets 1.043***
(0.266)
Previous non Payer -0.871***
(0.054)
Likelihood Ratio Test Chi
2 235.23 213.18 210.29 287.21 299.69 585.62
Observations 2334 1864 1864 1864 1864 1829
The dependent variable is the ratio of ordinary dividends to earnings. The estimates are obtained from a tobit
model. Return on equity is total earnings before depreciation divided by total nominal equity. Size is the natural
logarithm of a company's total assets. Age is the number of years since a company was incorporated. Earned to
Ordinary is any earnings not previously distributed as dividends divided by nominal ordinary equity. Ordinary
Equity to Total Assets is nominal ordinary equity divided by total assets. Cash to assets is total cash balances
(including financial investments) divided by total assets. Tobin's Q is (book value of debt + book value of
preference equity + market value of common equity) / (book value of total assets). Earned Equity to Total Assets
is any earnings that the company has not previously distributed as dividends divided by total assets. Previous non
payer is a dummy variable equal to one if the company did not pay an ordinary dividend in the previous year, and
equal to zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by firm and appear in parentheses.
Determinants of the Dividend Payout Ratio
Unlisted Companies
Table XII